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Politics, public expenditure and the evolution of poverty in Africa 1920-
2009 
 
Sue Bowden and Paul Mosley1 
 
This draft: 5 December 2011 
 
Abstract. We investigate the historical roots of poverty, with particular reference to the 
experience of Africa during the twentieth century. Like the recent studies by Acemoglu et al 
(2001, etc) we find that institutional inheritance is an important influence on current 
underdevelopment; but in addition, we argue that the influence of policies on institutions is 
highly significant, and that in Africa at least, a high representation of European settlers in land 
ownership and policy-making was a source of weakness, and not of strength. We argue this 
thesis, using mortality rates as a proxy for poverty levels, with reference to two settler 
colonies – Zimbabwe and Kenya – and two peasant export colonies – Uganda and Ghana. 
Our findings suggest that in Africa, settler-type political systems tended to produce highly 
unequal income distributions and, as a consequence, patterns of public expenditure and 
investment in human and infrastructural capital which were strongly biased against 
smallholder agriculture and thence against poverty reduction, whereas peasant-export type 
political systems produced more equal income distributions whose policy structures and, 
consequently, production functions were less biased against the poor. As a consequence, 
liberalisation during the 1980s and 90s produced asymmetric results, with poverty falling 
sharply in the ‘peasant export’ and rising in settler economies. These contrasts in the 
evolution of poverty in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, we argue, can only 
be understood by reference to differences between the settler and peasant export economies 
whose roots lie in political decisions taken a hundred years previously. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the problem of persistent poverty in developing countries has 
recently attracted considerable attention in the literature, culminating in the 
announcement of the Millennium Development Goals, few recent studies of 
poverty in developing countries have used a long-term time-perspective. With 
the exception of the recent papers by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) and Nunn(2007),  nearly all of the research effort on poverty in 
developing countries has been focussed on data from the last twenty years, 
and on policy initiatives related to those data. In part, this is because the 
measure of deprivation most commonly used for international comparisons -  
headcount poverty -  has only been recorded since the late 1980s or in some 
cases the 1990s.  However, if poverty is deeply rooted and transferred from 
generation to generation, as much recent literature suggests2, any explanation 
of that poverty needs to find a way of analysing its long-term causes. 
                                                 
 
 
1
  Sue Bowden is at the Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, 
Heslington, York, YO 10 5DD; Paul Mosley, the corresponding author, is at the Department of 
Economics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S1 4DT.  Our thanks to Blessing Chiripanhura for his 
most valuable research support, and also to participants at the Economic History Society conference at 
Warwick, 1-3 April 2009.   
 
2
   See the recent book by Addison, Hulme and Kanbur(2009), especially the essays by Calvo and 
Dercon, Harriss and Quisumbing.  Awareness of long-term persistence of poverty is of long standing:        
it was nearly forty years ago that the World Bank reported that ‘more than a decade of rapid growth in 
underdeveloped countries has been of little or no benefit to perhaps a third of their population’ 
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In this paper we attempt to do this, focussing on sub-saharan Africa. To 
finesse the problem of short data series on poverty,  we use long-period 
variations in the level of mortality – in particular infant mortality below the age 
of one – as the indicator of deprivation which has to be explained in order to 
understand long-period changes in well-being. This indicator, unlike 
headcount poverty, is available for many developing countries since the early 
twentieth and in some cases the nineteenth century. It has its limitations, 
discussed in detail in Appendix 3 below; but it is available over a much longer 
historical period, it is well correlated with the ‘World Bank standard’ 
(headcount) measure of poverty during years when both indicators are 
available, and it is in some senses a better in-principle measure of human 
(under) development than the World Bank income measure, because it better 
captures the health, nutrition and extreme poverty dimensions of deprivation. 
 
 Our approach, in common with Acemoglu et al. accepts that the 
fundamental determinants of underdevelopment and deprivation are 
institutional and long-term. However, by contrast with Acemoglu et al’s focus 
on freedom of property rights from expropriation, we take a different view of 
the process by which poverty is determined, focussing on the politics 
surrounding the colonial production pattern as the fundamental determinant of 
long-term poverty trends. Our starting-point is that the poorest people, 
everywhere, are those who have nothing to sell but their labour; those who 
hold a claim to any form of productive capital asset (including, for the 
purposes of this argument, land, skills and social connections as well as 
physical capital equipment) will for that reason be above this lowest level 
(Iliffe, 1987). Hence a production pattern that is pro-poor will be a production 
pattern that is intensive in low-income labour, and this will be typically be 
associated with a relatively equal income distribution; incrementally, poverty 
reduction will be associated with investment in poor people’s capital both 
human and infrastructural. Two important reasons for putting the stress on 
income distribution are, first, that under an equal income distribution the 
demand for manufactures (  hence productivity) will be greater than under an 
unequal income distribution, and, second, that the level of inter-group 
resentment and civil unrest, which depress investment and growth, will be 
also be less where income is more equally distributed (Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1989; Alesina and Rodrik 1994 ; Alesina and Perotti 1996; Nafziger 
and Auvinen 2000). In turn, we see income distribution in developing countries 
in the twentieth century as determined by the political decisions made during 
the colonial period concerning how to make the colony viable. Both in Asia 
and in Africa, it is possible to identify two alternative strategies, labelled by 
Myint (1976) as the mine/plantation (or settler) and the peasant export 
approaches to development, according as European agriculturists were or 
were not legally authorised to own land. We argue that the latter strategy 
                                                                                                                                            
(Chenery 1975, page xiii). Persistence of poverty over long periods has also  been observed in 
industrialised countries,  of course, and  regions reporting little or no improvement in the living 
standards of poor people during long periods of growth  include Russia during the second half of the 
nineteenth century (Gerschenkron 1959) and of course, Britain during its industrial revolution from 
1760 to 1830 (see Crafts, 1997, Feinstein, 1998 and Maddison, 2001). 
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placed in the hands of lower income groups a cluster of assets, not only 
permanent export crops but also the infrastructure and training required to 
produce and export them, which were to be important in determining the 
potential for future poverty reduction processes. For empirical purposes ( as 
illustrated in Figure 1), we take Ghana and Uganda here as being illustrative 
of the peasant export approach and Kenya and Zimbabwe as illustrating the 
settler approach to colonial development.  
 
Figure 1. ‘Settler’ and ‘peasant export’ economies of Africa, late 1930s 
 
 
 
Source:.Table 1; map original from Hailey (1938), p. 1536. 
 
During the global depression of the 1930s, many observers drew the 
connection between equality of income distribution and strength of demand in 
the peasant export economies. One of these was an Asian member of the 
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Kenya Legislative Council, Isher Dass,  who advised European merchants 
and traders during the debate on the Kenya Land Commission: 
 
not to forget the fact that they cannot possibly thrive so long as the great bulk of the 
native peasantry remain wage slaves, merely capable of purchasing a little salt and 
snuff now and then, and a cheap blanket and a small supply of beads once a year. In 
countries possessing a prosperous native peasantry, such as Uganda and the West 
Coast of Africa, you can sell, not only salt and cheap blankets, but motor cycles and 
motor cars in their thousands, besides dinner suits and dress suits, building materials, 
footwear, headwear and all the other paraphernalia of modern civilisation.3   
 
In short, poverty, on this view, is caused by unequal access to the means of 
production, and unequal access to the means of production is perpetuated by 
policies which preclude the poor from access to them. Our picture of the 
causal sequence which is crucial in determining poverty dynamics, in relation 
to that presented by Acemoglu et al., is in Figure 2. Our focus in this paper is 
on the policy decisions, both in relation to  early land-settlement and in 
relation to later resource allocation, which, we argue, exerted a definitive 
impact on the pattern of access to resources and thence on the potential for 
subsequent poverty reduction. 
 
                                                 
3
  Isher Dass, Kenya Legislative Council Debates, 19 October 1934, col 589. See also 
Archdeacon Owen, in United Kingdom, Report of the joint committee on closer union in East Africa, 
vol II: oral evidence, House of Lords 29 of 1930, p.97, who referred to ‘a hum of prosperity on the 
Uganda side of the border where there is stagnation on the Kenya side’. Especially in times of global 
recession, trading and manufacturing interests dealing with settler economies were keenly aware that, 
because of income inequality, they were disadvantaged in relation to peasant-export economies. Further 
evidence of this same point  is provided by a comparison made at time between the settler economy of 
Zimbabwe and the peasant-export economy of Jamaica, which at that time had the same population and 
average income as Zimbabwe but much higher black purchasing power:  
 ‘Of the West Indian colonies perhaps Jamaica affords the most interesting comparison. The 
population of Jamaica, which is 98% coloured and black, is almost the same in numbers as our native 
population. But the landed cost of imports into Jamaica was something like £4 million, whereas the 
corresponding figure for this colony was about £1 210 000 which with the addition of local purchases 
represents a purchasing power of about 30s. per head. Now supposing that only 25 per cent of our 
native population increased their purchasing power from 30s to 70s per head, the Jamaican level, this 
would mean an increase in the value of the native trade of at least £500 000 per annum… Surely then, 
on commercial grounds alone, apart from any moral obligation, it should be the policy to encourage the 
native in the attainment of higher standards’ 
 (National Archives of Zimbabwe:S1216/SC1/100/110, memo  to Associated Chambers of Commerce, 
10 March 1933). 
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Figure 2. Alternative causal sequences determining the level of poverty 
and deprivation: 
 
(a) Acemoglu et al (2001). 
 
 
      
(b) This model 
 
We develop our argument in three steps. In the next section, Section 1, we 
examine the experience of Africa over the past hundred years, and in the light 
of that experience, illustrate the proposition that in those countries which 
allowed ownership of land by European settlers, by contrast with those 
countries which did not, a pattern of policy, especially fiscal policy, emerged 
which was bad at reducing poverty and deprivation. Three components of this 
policy regime are particularly important, -the mix of policy between sectors,  
the level of investment in the human capital of the poor, and the rate of 
taxation imposed on the poor, in particular on exports by primary producers. In 
Section 2 we relate these factors to the trend of real wages and mortality in 
the selected countries. In Section 3, we test these hypotheses 
econometrically, and Section 4 concludes.   
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1. The political determinants of settlement and expenditure patterns 
Colonial origins of ‘settler’ and ‘peasant export’ economies, 1890-1929   
During the final quarter of the nineteenth century, Africa was divided up  
between the metropolitan powers in what became known as the ‘Scramble for 
Africa’. This process and its economic and political rationale have been much 
debated (Gallagher and Robinson (1958), Cain and Hopkins (1987), Offer 
(1993)). What is however not in question is that any country once colonised 
needed a strategy to minimise the net cost which it imposed on the 
metropolitan country, and the focus of this inquiry is on the implications of the 
two contrasted strategies which were employed in Africa to achieve this. 
 
We described these strategies above, following Myint (1976), as 
settler-  and peasant export- based economic strategies. Settler economies 
(such as, in Africa, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia, Angola and DRC 
Congo) are those in which the chosen strategy was to allow agricultural land 
to be appropriated by European settlers, who often found themselves 
operating in competition with indigenous farmers. Peasant export economies 
(such as Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, Mali, Senegal, Togo and Cameroon) are 
those in which Europeans were not allowed to own land and agricultural 
production and exports were in the hands of indigenous African smallholders4. 
A division of African economies between the ‘settler’ and the ‘peasant export’ 
type as of the mid-1930s, at which point the key differences in economic 
structure had fully emerged, is as shown in Table 1.5 As can be seen from the 
table, in the settler economies, and there only, the control of expatriates over 
land quickly translated itself into control over the apparatus of government, 
including over the allocation of public resources between rich and poor 
recipients. 
                                                 
4
  Myint’s ideal types extend across the whole developing world, and are not confined to Africa. 
For a discussion of ‘settler’ economies see Denoon (1979  ) and Mosley (1983) . Discussion of peasant 
export economies is rather more country-specific, but see, for Uganda, Joergensen(1981), and for 
Ghana, Kimble(1963) 
 
5
  The criterion for being a ‘settler’ economy is that 5 per or more or the total land area was 
reserved for Europeans in 1920. During the first years of the twentieth century, when the colonial state 
did not control the entire country, the criterion is ambiguous, because it was common in some African 
countries for Europeans to settle land on their own initiative without having any formal title to it.  
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Table 1. African countries: ‘settler’ and ‘peasant export’ economies, circa 1938 
 
 
Settler: Share of 
land 
alienated or 
reserved for 
Europeans 
% 
 Elective 
representat
ion of non-
Africans on 
legislative 
body 
Peasant export: Share of 
land 
alienated 
or reserved 
for 
Europeans 
% 
Elective 
representation 
of non-Africans 
on legislative 
body 
South Africa 87 92 (note 1) Ghana 0  36 (note 3) 
Zimbabwe 
( Southern 
Rhodesia) 
49 100 (note 
2) 
Uganda 0    0 (note 4) 
Zambia 
(Northern 
Rhodesia) 
3 92 Tanganyika 0    0 (note 5) 
Kenya 7 72 Nigeria 0   0 ( direct 
elections at 
municipal not 
federal level; 
elsewhere, 
indirect rule 
through native 
authorities) 
Angola 12 76 Mali 0 Na 
 Congo DRC 
(Belgian Congo) 
9 80 Upper Volta 
(Burkina Faso) 
0 Na 
Swaziland 65 na Rwanda 1 0 (no direct 
elections, 
chiefs 
exercising 
quasi-feudal 
authority) 
 
  Mozambique 3 0 
 
Sources:   extended and adapted from Mosley (1983), Table 1.1., using in particular data from 
Hailey (1938). ‘na’ = not available. 
Notes:1. In Transkei, four African representatives chosen either by election or by chiefs’ 
nomination. In all other states, representation of Africans vested in Governor-General. 
2. Representation of Africans in legislative assembly by appointment through Minister of 
Native Affairs, not by election. 
3. Proportion of elected European members fixed by 1928 constitution. After 1958, no elected 
European members. 
4. No direct elections to Uganda legislative assembly; members nominated by chiefs at 
county level. 
5. No direct elections; indirect rule through native authorities 
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Access by low-income groups to public capital goods 
  From these differences in policy-making structures, there emerged an 
important difference in resource allocation: low-income Africans had better 
access to public capital goods, both physical and human, in peasant export 
than in settler economies, and also a pattern of recurrent expenditure which 
was more pro-poor. The political rationale for this lay partly with the 
metropolitan countries, because all of them were under pressure to develop 
the export base of the colonies as a defence against the erosion of market 
share which they were already beginning to encounter in world markets; and 
whereas in the settler economies they could expect the capital provided by 
European settlers to finance the necessary infrastructural investments to 
make those exports viable, they could not, because of the prior decision not to 
allow European settlement, finance the investments required to make the 
Ugandan cotton industry or the Ghanaian cocoa industry viable in the same 
manner.  And at the local level, a voice was given in the peasant export 
economies, unlike the settler economies (table 1) to African chiefs and other 
regional-level authorities, which then from the 1920s onward came 
increasingly to demand their proper share of resources for roads, education, 
health, and other inputs required to raise the productivity of the poor6. By the 
end of the 1920s, this difference in governance patterns had, as we saw 
above, driven a wedge between the productive potential of the African poor 
and lower-middle income groups in peasant-export economies by contrast 
with settler economies.  
We may examine the working of this process first in relation to capital 
expenditures.The pace of infrastructure-building quickened in the 1920s, and 
by 1925, several hundreds of thousands of low-income Ghanaians and 
Ugandans had a connection to the line of rail within immediate reach, whereas 
black rural South Africans, Zimbabweans and (with the exception of one line) 
Kenyans had no access to rail transport7.  This differential pattern of provision 
                                                 
6
  These political pressures and their economic consequences are eloquently discussed by 
Kimble(1963) in Ghana and by Jorgensen(1981) in Uganda. The terms of trade, and thus the living 
standards of the poor in particular, declined severely during the 1914-1918 war (see Table A1 below) 
and a joint meeting of the chiefs complained in March 1918 that ‘While the Gold Coast produce is 
taken for almost nothing…the prices of European goods have reached such a prohibitive height that 
one feels most unhappy’;they further threatened that if no official action were taken, they would have 
to do something to guard against such manifest exploitation of the natives’ poor resources’ and indeed 
three years later, in 1921, an association was formed which forbade anyone to sell their cocoa at a price 
lower than 15s. a head. This was the first organised attempt to stop cocoa sales (  Ghana National 
Archives: SNA692,Case33/1918,  Memorandum 5 March 1918 to Governor, quoted in Kimble 
1963:49-50.) In Uganda, also, there were pressures from the chiefs to provide compensation for 
people’s sufferings during the wartime period, against which the small population of white settler-
producers remaining in Uganda put up some resistance: for these pressures and the colonial 
government’s response to these in the 1920s see Jorgensen(1981), 161-165. 
 
7
 Locations of railways in 1938 are illustrated in Figure 1. By that year Ghana had 550  miles of 
railway track running through African smallholder areas and Uganda 350; Kenya had only the 120 
miles of the Nairobi- Nanyuki branch line, which ran partly through European and partly through 
African areas,  and Zimbabwe had none, as none of its lines of rail ran through African reserves . 
Railways made a colossal difference to the costs and thus the competitiveness of African producers (the 
first railway in Ghana, build between 1898 and 1904, enabled a 60lb. headload to be transported at a 
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applied not only to physical capital but also to what a later World Bank report 
on poverty (World Bank, 1990 ) was to refer to as ‘investment in the human 
capital of the poor’. Even by the Second World War, no university or institution 
of higher education offering access to black students existed in any part of 
Kenya, Zimbabwe or South Africa; but Ghana had Achimota, founded in 1920, 
and Uganda had Makerere, founded in 1922, which indeed through the 1930s 
and 1940s took in students from other African countries without a university 
including Kenya, Tanganyika and Zanzibar8.  At the secondary level, Ghana 
and Uganda had enrolment levels many times higher than those prevailing in 
the settler economies (Table 2), which not only made a direct contribution to 
equalising their income distributions, but also enabled Ghanaian and 
Ugandan Africans to unlock the gateway to the higher reaches of the civil 
service – as Jorgenson argues in the case of Uganda, ‘access to education 
rather than ownership of land became the passport to administrative cadres in 
Uganda from the 1930s onward, although it was agricultural surpluses which 
were the key to obtaining school fees for one’s children’(Jorgensen 1981:165)   
Even at the primary level of education, which impacts more directly on the 
poverty reduction process,  investment in education was much stronger in the 
peasant-export than in the settler economies, and integrally related with the 
growth of peasant exports. As Hurd relates for the case of Ghana, 
A crucial factor bringing about social change was the spread, in the 1920s and 30s, of 
cocoa farming into Ashanti from the Akwapim area [nearer the coast]. The significant factor 
about cocoa farming was that athough it was still carried out on the basis of peasant farms, it 
represents a change to a cash-crop economy from the earlier forms of subsistence 
aagriculture. It was only after…(the involvement of South Ashanti in the cash-crop economy) 
that the rate of educational expansion quickened, so that cocoa farming may be said to have 
performed the same function in South Ashanti as the expansion of trade had earlier 
performed for the colony (G.E. Hurd, ‘Education’, chapter 6 in Birmingham et al (1962).  
                                                                                                                                            
cost of 4s. instead of 26s.6d. in three days instead of eight: Kimble 1963:30)  and in effect moved  
anyone within their reach  out of the subsistence economy into the cash economy. 
 
8
 Both Achimota and Makerere Colleges, during the interwar period, awarded their students external 
degrees of the University of London. They were not granted their own degree-awarding powers until 
after World War 2. For the detail of the  visionary health and education reforms implemented by 
Guggisberg in the 1920s see Wraith(1967) chapters 5-6. 
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Table 2 . Educational  provision and enrolments in selected African countries, 1900-1960 
 
 
 Settler economies Peasant export economies 
 Zimbabwe Kenya Ghana Uganda 
 
Tertiary 
(university) 
level 
Secondary 
level 
Primary 
level 
Tertiary 
(university) 
level 
Secondary 
level 
Primary 
level 
Tertiary 
(university) 
level 
Secondary 
level 
Primary 
level 
Tertiary 
(university) 
level 
Secondary 
level 
Primary 
level 
1910 0 0  0 0  0  12136 0   
1920 0 0  0 0  0 207 28580 0   
1926 0 0 77610 0  80881   32827 108   
1930 0 0 108752 
 
0 392  90 601 53000 
(1.8%) 
107   
1938 0 120  0 430 82105 
(2.5%) 
180   180 248 309387 
(8.1%) 
1940 0 160  0 450  300 2635 88000 
(2.7%) 
   
1950 250 255 232689 
 
0 560 225,000 600 6162 154400 
(3.7%) 
250   
1960 600  484299      701000 
(10.4%) 
   
 
Sources: Zimbabwe: Yearbook of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia, successive issues. Kenya, Ghana  and Uganda: Blue Books  and 
Educational Reports, various issues.
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This differential impetus derived not only from the political forces described 
above but also from the vision and ‘social entrepreneurship’, as we would now 
call it, of specific individuals. In the Ghana of the 1920s, a visionary Governor, 
Gordon Guggisberg, implanted his vision of infrastructure-led development 
focussed on the African population into the government’s development 
budget, the result of which was not only showpiece tertiary institutions such as 
Achimota, and ‘the finest hospital of the time’ (Wraith 1967:4) at Korle Bu, 
Accra, but also an infrastructure of primary, secondary and technical health 
and educational institutions which, as we shall see, was able by the 1920s to 
push mortality rates well below the levels prevailing in settler economies. It is 
very clear that, as in Anne Booth’s account of south-east Asia at the same 
time (2007), what was being constructed in this kind of colonial economy was 
not at all a ‘nightwatchman state’ restricted to the provision of security 
functions, but rather a state capable of purposive and indeed progressive 
developmental interventions9. 
                 We now examine the pattern of recurrent expenditures, which also 
(Hudson, Lenton and Mosley, 2009) have the political function of signalling the 
interest-groups with which government was aligned. In the peasant export 
economies, much more than in the settler economies, the government shifted 
over the course of the 1920s from an expenditure pattern oriented towards 
security and ‘coercive’ expenditures towards an expenditure pattern orientated 
towards pro-poor developmental activities for the benefit of the African 
majority – in particular education, health and smallholder agriculture. In Table 
3 below, we show that the share of public expenditure attached to these 
‘poverty-reducing’ functions was from the 1920s onward higher in the peasant 
export than in the settler economies. We refer to this share henceforward as 
pro-poor expenditure. In Table 3 we delineate pro-poor expenditure in two 
different forms: as the share of pro-poor functions (health, education and 
agriculture) in GNP  and as this share net of ‘coercive’ (military, police and 
prisons) expenditure, which may be seen as deducting from potential pro-poor 
impact both because military expenditure is more capital- and import-intensive 
than agricultural and human capital production, and because military 
expenditure is associated with civil disturbance which is disruptive of 
development10. 
                                                 
9
  We mean the phrase ‘progressive’ not only in the sense of investing in primary health and education, 
but in the sense of investment biased towards the poorer regions of the peasant export colonies. 
Guggisberg ‘was accused, and cheerfully accepted the accusation, of being a fanatic about the Northern 
Territories’ (the poorest region of Ghana, treated by previous administrations more as a labour reserve 
than as a terrain for development). Wraith (1967:112,156). 
10
  For the origins of the concept of pro-poor expenditure, see Mosley, Hudson and 
Verschoor(2004), especially appendix 1, which provides evidence in support of the idea that 
agriculture, education and social services have a relatively high propensity to impact on the livelihoods 
of the poor. The concept of ‘coercion’ is due to Jorgensen(1981).  
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Table 3. Comparative evolution of selected ‘settler’ and ‘peasant export’ economies, 1911-2006 
 ‘Settler economies’ ‘Settler 
economies’ 
( average 1+2) 
‘Peasant export economies’ Peasant export  
economies 
(average 3+4) 
 (1)Zimbabwe (2)Kenya  (3)Uganda (4)Ghana  
 M W AS PPE
C 
M W AS PPE
C 
M W AS PPE
C 
M W AS PPE
C 
M W AS PPE
C 
M W AS PPE
C 
1911-20 225 73 0.10 4.5  100 0.06 3.8  86 0.08 4.2  77 0.39 -3.6 295 84 2.67 -0.4  81 1.53 -2.0 
1921-30 246 69 0.12 8.9 400 80 0.08 10.1 309 84 0.10 9.5 245 117 0.91 7.9 206 139 3.89 14.2 227 129 2.36 11.8 
1931-40 267 88 0.09 9.8 287 76 0.07 9.8 285 84 0.08 9.8 171 209 1.19 14.4 110 148 2.28 18.9 136 178 1.54 14.3 
1941-50 264 88 0.22 14.2 182 87 0.24 10.4 223 88 0.23 12.3 126 146 1.26 13.8 106 150 3.30 18.7 115 148 2.28 16.2 
1951-60 178 112 0.44 18.4 145 109 0.72 11.7 161 110 1.01 15.0 126 285 5.84 22.7 115 172 6.52 18.7 120 228 6.18 16.8 
1961-70 161 148 0.73 16.9 120 130 2.14 
 
9.4 143 
 
145 1.32 13.2 104 541 6.68  120 267 9.84 29.0 112 404 8.41 21.1 
1971-80 120 150 2.38 15.4 85 150 6.29 11.2 102 
 
150 4.38 13.3 109 372 11.1  105 233 23.8 20.3 107 302 17.4 16.8 
1981-90 77 180 3.14 20.4 71 164 9.5 14 74 
 
172 6.37 17.2 104 217 13.7 5.7 86 275 19.3 15.3 93 246 16.5 18.4 
1991-
2000 
68 121 2.37 12.7 68 160 11.8 13.2 68 
 
140 12.0 13.0 95 398  8.7 80 385 14.9 15.5 85 391 14.9 12.1 
2001-6 91 88 0.14 4.8 78  9.2 6.4 84  4.62 5.6 79 458  16.4 65  22.6 13.7 73  15.2 15.2 
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Sources for Table 5: (all data presented are ten –year arithmetic mean values of the variable stated) 
 
Mortality indicator (M): Infant mortality rate, that is mortality rate per thousand of those below 1 year of age: 
principally from World Bank, World Development Indicators, and from Kuczynski (1948), supplemented by sources 
listed in Appendix below. 
 
Real wage indicator ( W) 1914=100 in all cases.  Data from Appendix 1. 
  
Agricultural sales (AS) are agricultural sales of African origin  per head of African population, derived from Blue 
Books and Annual Trade Reports of the countries specified. These are defined as sales within the following 
countries:  Zimbabwe: maize, ‘small grains’, (finger and bulrush millet), groundnuts, cotton, smallholder tobacco, fruits 
vegetables. Kenya: maize, smallholder coffee, smallholder tea, smallholder pyrethrum, fruits, vegetables. Kenya: 
maize, smallholder coffee, smallholder tea, smallholder pyrethrum, fruits, vegetables, sugar. Ghana: maize, cocoa 
and derivatives, kolanuts, fruits, vegetables, sugar.  
 
Pro-poor expenditure (PPE):  combined share of agriculture, health and education in GDP, from Blue Books, and 
after 1970  from IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. 
 
Pro-poor expenditure less coercion (PPE-C):  combined share of agriculture, health and education, less share of  
‘coercion’  (military, police and prisons expenditure) in GDP, from Blue Books, and after 1970  from IMF Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook. 
 
 
Production technologies and ‘poverty externalities’ 
The result of these differences in political structure, and consequently 
in expenditure allocations, was to produce a difference in the production 
functions of the two groups of economies, and in particular in the pro-poor 
impetus attaching to each of these groups 11. As first illustrated by 
Baldwin(1963), whether or not the law of one price holds, there is certainly no 
law of one technology: within developing countries, different sectors differ 
enormously in their input requirements per unit of output, and thence in their 
ability to reduce poverty. Particularly crucial is whether leading (fast-growing) 
sectors are intensive in the use of resources which can be supplied by the 
poor; and this means in the first instance labour, because the poorest people 
in the poorest countries have little else which they can sell(World Bank, 2000; 
Narayan, Rademacher and Koch-Schulte, 2000). As a broad generalisation, 
growth in which the leading sector is (among non-traded goods) construction 
and services and above all smallholder agriculture is pro-poor (partly through 
its demands for low-income labour, but also by achieving a reduction in the 
price of foods consumed by the poor), whereas economies in which the 
dominant sectors are capital-intensive (such as, in most economies, oil and 
gas production, mineral production, or military expenditure) have much less 
pro-poor production functions12. And peasant export economies, because 
their politics did not restrict the development of smallholder agriculture and 
                                                 
11
  This is also illustrated by Booth (2005) in south-east Asia, see her Tables 5 and 6. 
 
12
  In respect of  smallholder and plantation agricultural activities, Baldwin quotes labour 
utilisation coefficients of 6.0 per $1,000 of output for the tea industry of Ceylon(Sri Lanka) for the 
1960s, 2.1 in the Cuban sugar growing industry, 3.5 in the rubber industry of West Africa and 2.6 in the 
rubber  industry of Malaya; by contrast, coefficients for mineral and extractive industries are much 
lower:  0.033 and 0.026 for the oil industry in Venezuela and Saudi Arabia respectively;0.08 for 
bauxite production in  Guyana;0.13 for the Zambian copper industry and 0.31 for iron ore production in 
India. All these examples are from Baldwin(1963), p.82, note 1. For a long-period discussion of factor 
proportions in the economic history of Africa, see also the essay by Austin (2007). 
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other pro-poor activities13, were more effective than settler economies at 
stimulating activities whose benefits either were directly aimed at, or spilled 
over on to, poor people. We refer to the latter as poverty externalities14.  
Because Ghanaian cocoa and Ugandan coffee and cotton were highly labour-
intensive, they were very effective at generating poverty externalities,  mostly 
in the shape of wages paid to people employed in export enclaves or to the 
small number of people employed in linkage activities, such as cotton ginning 
or cocoa processing, attached to those production sectors. 
 
2. Real wages, quality of life and the Lewis growth model in the two 
systems 
Real wage and mortality data 
 Different political power-structures, as we have illustrated, produced 
different allocations of capital assets to the poor in colonial times.  We now 
seek to trace through the implications of these differences in allocation 
patterns for long-period trends in living standards and poverty rates. Our 
template will be the Lewis model (Lewis 1954) of economic development with 
unlimited supplies of labour, itself inspired by evidence of near-subsistence 
wage rates throughout the industrial revolution period in Britain (1760-1840)15.  
The Lewis model has already served as inspiration for a number of long-
period empirical studies of real wage rates in the developing countries of 
Africa,  Asia and the Caribbean ( Eisner (1961) for Jamaica; Arrighi (1970) for 
Zimbabwe; Wilson (1972) for South Africa;  Huff ( 2007) for Burma, Thailand 
                                                 
13
  At its peak in 1927,  Ghanaian cocoa accounted for over 40% of world output, and over 70% 
of all Ghanaian exports consisted of (mainly smallholder) exports of cocoa. Gold Coast, Blue Book 
1927. 
 
14
  The poverty elasticity or ‘marginal propensity to reduce poverty per unit of growth’, 
d log P/d log Y, may be characterised as 
d log P/d log Y  =   ∂ log P               .        ∂ log (eiAi(σ)/Y)   (2) 
                               ∂ log(eiAi (σ)/Y)          ∂ log Y 
where, as before,  
P  is poverty and  
Y  is income,  
 
and also:  
σ  is a measure of vertical inequality of income distribution (e.g.    
 Gini coefficient); 
Ai is the leverage (share in output) of any sector i within the economy; 
ei   is a measure of the ‘poverty externalities’ provided by that sector ( the propensity to reduce 
 poverty attached to each of the sectors Ai). 
 
It will be clear that the higher is the level of poverty externalities ei, the higher is the overall poverty 
elasticity. 
15
  At the time Lewis wrote, in the 1950s, the main evidence available to him was the three-volume 
study by J.L. and Barbara Hammond ( 1911-19 ) together with the data gathered by Deane and Cole, 
eventually published as Deane and Cole (1964)  , both of which suggested that real wages in Great 
Britain had a tendency to be stagnant or near-stagnant during the Industrial Revolution period, 1760-
1840. Subsequent research on this period ( Horrell and Humphries (1992 ), Crafts 1997, and Feinstein 
1998)  has used a wider range of sources and indicators of well-being than that available to Lewis, but 
much of this literature supports his initial intuition that the industrial revolution period was 
characterised by stagnant real wages made possible, as in developing countries, by ‘disguised 
unemployment’ within subsistence activities in the service, agricultural and home-working sectors. 
 15 
and Malaya ). The fundamental premiss of the Lewis model is that so long as 
there is surplus labour in the ‘traditional sector’ – those production activities 
which do not use reproducible capital – the supply curve of labour to the other 
sectors of the economy is flat, the consequence of which is that the real wage 
and the standard of living are pegged down to near-subsistence levels, 
regardless of productivity, for as long as the labour surplus persists. In all the 
examples quoted above, the real wage does not rise from its near-subsistence 
floor until at least the end of the Second World War, which is treated by the 
authors mentioned as an outcome consistent with the predictions of the Lewis 
model. 
 In the context of these estimates, we can now present our own 
estimates (Figure 3) of long-term real wage trends through the same period16, 
which suggest  that real wages remained tied close to the subsistence level in 
the settler economies of Kenya and Zimbabwe for nearly the entire twentieth 
century (with occasional ephemeral surges during macro-economic boom 
periods), but rose above that level in the peasant export economies of 
Uganda and Ghana as early as the 1920s; and, in spite of relapses in the 
1940s and 1970s in both countries, they never, during the second half of the 
twentieth century, fell back to the ‘settler’ level. Moreover, there appears to be 
a strong link from real wages to infant mortality, our selected indicator of 
poverty; a sustained fall in the infant death rate began, on the evidence 
available to us, in Ghana in the early 1920s, in Uganda ten years later, but in 
the settler economies not until twenty years after that, in the 1950s . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Full data series and notes on methods of calculation of our real-wage index are in the Appendix. 
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Figure 3. The settler-peasant export dichotomy: mortality, real wages 
and smallholder sales 
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 How can these trends in real wages and in living standards be 
explained, either in terms of the ‘poverty externalities’ story of Section 2 or 
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 First we must fit in to the story an explanation much emphasised by 
Lewis. Lewis was always at pains to stress that the flat segment of his  
‘unlimited supplies of labour’ model did not apply to all developing countries, 
but only to labour-surplus countries. From this category he excluded the 
majority of African countries and quite explicitly the case of Ghana, a country 
which he came to know well in the 1950s as adviser17 and which in his view 
was characterised by ‘an abundance of land and an acute shortage of 
labour’18. Another possibility considered by Lewis was that the cost of labour 
might be pushed up by shortage of suitable land for export crop production. In 
relation to Ghana, he argued that ‘mineral-bearing lands, or lands with just the 
right suitability for cocoa, are relatively scarce…if these scarce lands are 
owned by peasants, the peasants may of course become rich’ (Lewis 
1954:443). In a modest way, this also occurred in the 1920s as the 
smallholder production frontier was extended, not only with respect to 
Ghanaian cocoa, but also with respect to Ugandan cotton, where: 
 
Migrants from Toro and Ankole19 in 1922 were responsible for producing at least a quarter of 
the Buganda cotton crop, and the  problem of transporting the pickings to metalled roads 
would have been ‘almost insoluble’ without their assistance. In Eastern Province, in  the two 
most important cotton-growing districts, Teso and Busoga, an average of over 60 shillings per 
head20 had been paid out to the adult  male population…The successful cotton harvest sent 
up the market rate for unskilled labour in Jinja by nearly 100 per cent21. 
 
‘Creation’ of surplus labour by policy -  the 1930s and 40s  
 Thus for a combination of reasons – labour shortage, land shortage,  
and a pro-poor allocation of recurrent and capital expenditure – a floor was by 
the end of the 1920s placed under the labour supply curve in the peasant-
export, but not in the settler economies (figure 4) .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
             For this period of Lewis’ career see Tignor (2005), chapters 5 and 6. 
18
            Lewis (1952) paragraph 28. Emphasis added. 
 
20
  About four times the 1914 real wage: see table 2 below. 
 
21
  Uganda National Archives,Entebbe: Entebbe Secretariat Archive, SMP 
5711(O.S.)/139. Cited in Powesland(1957):38. 
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Figure 4: ‘Settler’ and ‘peasant-export’ economies in the Lewis model 
framework 
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With a broadening of African labour-market opportunities and increases in the 
social wage received by many Africans at this time (table 3), this translated 
first in Ghana in the 1920s (Kuczynski 1949, vol. 1, p.523 )  , then ten years 
later in Uganda, into a reduction in the African mortality rate. During the 
1930s, in spite of a collapse of world cocoa and coffee prices, there was only 
a  small reduction in the supply of Ghanaian and Ugandan primary exports 
(table 3) and thus in producer incomes.  
In the settler economies of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, the 
evolution of policy and thus of African incomes was very different. The 
governments of each of those countries established commodity-control 
schemes to protect the livelihoods of white farmers against price collapse. 
Formal discrimination between black and white producers was, under the 
constitutions of each of those countries at that time, still illegal, and so 
informal discrimination was achieved through complex administrative 
structures under which African maize surpluses were bought within African 
reserve areas by traders acting as agents on behalf of the newly-established 
government maize control boards, which then sold the African maize on the 
export market at the depressed prices of the time, leaving the protected high-
Increase in pro-poor 
expenditure or 
education:outward 
shift 
Political disturbance 
or increase  in 
producer price quasi-
taxation index: inward 
shift 
shift 
Real 
wage 
Real 
wage 
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priced local market to be supplied by European producers (Mosley 1983, 
chapter 2).  Under the stress of these pressures, African livelihoods, 
especially in regions where crop production was least resilient, were pushed 
down towards the subsistence minimum22. During the depression, the peasant 
export economies, in Ghana, Uganda and elsewhere, had no part in 
commodity agreements, since they were dominated by the interests of 
commodity buyers, who had great interest in expanding production but no 
interest at all in a high price. However, as world commodity prices rose during 
the late 1930s and after the Second World War, buyers’ commercial interest in 
keeping the buying price as low as they could manage merged with the fiscal 
interest of the colonial administration. Between them, these interests 
established their own form of commodity control, in the form of boards such as 
the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board and the Uganda Coffee Marketing Board 
and Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Boards, across all of the peasant export 
economies.  As illustrated in Table 4, these marketing boards derived public 
revenue from paying the (African) smallholder producer less, often a good 
deal less, than the export realisation ( Bates 1981:137-145; Joergensen 1981: 
Appendix Table A3 ). The name ‘marketing boards’, in this context, was 
simply a euphemism for taxes on African smallholder exports, and their 
importance for our present argument is that what they were taxing was in 
large part the motor by which poverty had previously been brought down in 
the peasant export economies. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Settler and peasant export economies: Prices paid to farmers 
as a share of export realisation, 1920-2007 
 
 Settler economies  Peasant export economies 
 Zimbabwe 
(maize) 
Kenya 
(maize) 
Average, 
settler 
economies 
Uganda 
(coffee) 
Ghana 
(cocoa) 
Average, 
peasant 
export 
economies 
1911-20 0.91   0.62 0.70 0.66 
1921-30 0.87 0.63 0.42 0.69 0.73 0.71 
1931-40 0.82 0.57 0.69 0.31 0.47 0.39 
1951-60 0.76 0.58 0.64 0.30 0.52 0.41 
1961-70 0.69 0.89 0.79 0.18 0.61 0.39 
1981-90 0.67 0.79 0.73 0.28 0.36 0.32 
1991-2000 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.55 0.66 
2000-
present 
   1.00 0.74 0.87 
 
Sources: Uganda to 1978: Annual Trade Reports; after 1978: figure 3.8, ‘Development of Producer 
Prices in Uganda’, in Akiyama(2001). Ghana,  to 1978: Annual Trade Reports; after 1978: figure 2.6, 
‘Cocoa producer prices in West Africa’ in Varangis and Schreiber(2001) Kenya and Zimbabwe:  1960 
and before from Mosley (1983) chapter 3; thereafter from World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 
 
                                                 
22
 During the 1970s, radical critiques of the Lewis model (such as Arrighi,1970) emphasised the role of 
policy mechanisms such as this (and, in the early days of colonisation, hut tax and forced labour as 
well) in creating cheap labour supplies in supplementation of market mechanisms. 
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This taxation of smallholder agriculture, with its huge poverty reduction 
potential, might have been expected to close the gap in poverty reduction 
performance between the peasant export economies and the settler 
economies23; and duly did so (Table 3 above). During the period of 
smallholder commodity marketing boards, from the 1940s through the early 
1980s, the ability of peasant export sectors to grow, and therefore to reduce 
poverty, was heavily compromised by the burden of export taxation. 
 
At the end of the Second World War, the pattern of expenditure was 
influenced, both in the settler and in the peasant-export colonies, by 
investments in secondary and higher education, and in industry, in pursuit of 
economic independence and in rather modest imitation of the import-
substituting industrialisation being attempted  at the time in Asia and Latin 
America24. Much of this investment was financed out of the proceeds of the 
levies on smallholder export production summarised in Table 4. This evolution 
in expenditure patterns occurred at a similar rate in the settler and the 
peasant-export colonies, and thus the ‘performance gap’ between the two 
groups of colonies in terms of pro-poor expenditure does not widen as it did in 
the 1920s and 1930s, but rather remains constant between the 1940s and 
1960s.  
  
Decolonisation, structural adjustment and the emergence of the 
‘governance state’, 1960-2007 
Following the lead of Ghana in 1955, most African countries, both of 
the settler and peasant export type, became politically independent during the 
1960s and 1970s. In all cases, they received large infusions of concessional 
aid from both bilateral and the newly-established multilateral donors at the 
point of independence and in most cases for decades afterwards. Africa has 
long been the most aid-dependent continent, as well as the poorest25, and in 
all the cases under examination the resources provided by aid donors have 
been crucial in influencing the balance of forces determining the rate of 
poverty reduction. The post-Second War international economic order, 
established at Bretton Woods in 1944 as a framework for global stability and 
growth after the international turbulence of the interwar period, provides for a 
gradual liberalisation, under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT; now the World Trade Organisation) of the high levels of 
protectionism prevailing during that period – of which, in Africa, controls on 
commodity marketing such as those summarised in Table 4 were an important 
component.  This liberalisation was to be accompanied under the Bretton 
Woods system, when required by short-term emergency finance from the IMF, 
                                                 
23
   The governments of settler economies, by contrast with peasant export economies, had an 
interest in keeping the price of controlled commodities as high as possible in order to support the 
European farmers to whom they were beholden. Through most of the post-war period (Table 4), 
because power was in the hands of agricultural producers rather than agricultural consumers, they were 
able to to keep the price of board-controlled commodities above the export realisation. 
 
24
             For Ghana, these attempts at import-substituting industrialisation are particularly well 
summarised by Killick(1978). 
25
  See for example World Bank (1998) 
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and on a more sustained basis by long-term credits from the World Bank and 
bilateral donors. Both in Africa and in other developing regions,  support of the 
latter type, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, principally took the form of 
project lending for infrastructure, including educational and health 
infrastructure: the liberalisation provided for under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was scarcely implemented at this time, and controls 
on exchange rates, prices and food subsidies were maintained in position in 
most countries. This approach, it has been alleged, inflicted severe economic 
costs on developing countries in terms of competitiveness foregone (Little, 
Scitovsky and Scott, 1977) ; but, as demonstrated by Bates (1981, 1983), 
enormous political benefits in the context of fragile political systems. For, in 
the context of the project mode which had become established as the norm, 
this mode offered highly visible selective benefits to specific client groups, at 
the expense of collective deprivations, such as export taxes (table 4 above) 
and overvalued exchange rates. The ‘project mode’ of supporting agricultural 
development was therefore, in the long term, economically ruinous but 
politically highly rational. 
 
At first, through the 1960s and 1970s, the approach was successful in 
raising investment and growth rates across most of Africa  and specifically, 
through high levels of investment in health and education, in lowering child 
and adult mortality (Table 3 above).  But by the end of the 1970s agricultural 
production per capita was falling across Africa as a whole, and food imports 
were rising (Bates 1981:1). And, across Africa as a whole but specifically in 
our four case-study economies, transcending the settler-peasant export 
divide, there were severe governance problems. These were of two kinds. 
The first was a chronic fiscal debility which prevented African governments, 
even through the relatively fat years of the 1970s, from maintaining a 
sustained investment in the kind of ‘green revolution’ programmes which had 
revolutionised smallholder agricultural productivity across Asia (and pushed 
up the ‘Lewis supply curve’) in the same decade. The second was a wave of 
political violence and instability, at its most dramatic in Uganda where the 
savagery and dispossession associated with the rule of Idi Amin caused per 
capita incomes in Uganda to fall by 40% between 1970 and 1987 (Reinikka 
and Collier, 2001). But the by now highly controlled peasant export economy 
of Ghana also experienced  instability of government, imposition of exchange 
rate controls and widespread decapitalisation during the 1970s ( Toye 1995 ); 
Zimbabwe had become embroiled in a decade-long guerrilla war against the 
breakaway white regime; and in Kenya, at this time one of the fastest-growing 
of African economies, an Assistant Minister, J.M. Kariuki, had been found 
dead in a ditch a few days after suggesting in public that  inequality in post-
colonial Kenya had grown to the point that it had become ‘a society of ten 
millionaires and ten million beggars’26. 
Common threads running through each of these cases were: the 
continuing weakness and lack of legitimacy of the post-colonial governmental 
apparatus; resentment at the size and the injustice of the gap between rich  
                                                 
26
  This episode is described by Leys (1975).  The ‘ten millionaires’ in this metaphor were the 
members of the immediate family of the President, Jomo Kenyatta, all of whom derived substantial 
rents from ownership of large farms, public corporations and other assets of the Kenyan economy. 
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(often white) and poor (almost invariably black); and a widening of this gap 
(especially in the peasant export economies)caused by corrupt utilisation of 
commodity stabilisation funds and other surpluses created by government 
patronage. As a consequence of this, the pro-poor expenditure ratio (Table 3), 
suffered in the 1970s, both in the peasant-export and in the settler economies. 
Africa, having ended the 1970s with its governance apparatus severely 
damaged, duly suffered more than any other region of the developing world.. 
Within the Bretton Woods international financial system, there was a major re-
alignment of responsibilities as the World Bank pressed for, and achieved, an 
expanded role within the task of repairing this damage. By the end of the 
1980s a large-scale shift in the Bank’s portfolio had occurred, away from the 
long-term project lending provided for in its 1944 articles of agreement and 
towards long-term programme lending (‘structural adjustment lending’27) 
conditioned on liberalisation of the economy. Government control over the 
economy had come to be seen by the international financial organisations 
(e.g. World Bank 1982) as the root of African economic, and specifically 
agricultural, weakness, and as the depression deepened, those organisations 
determined to exact liberalisation of the economy as the price of their financial 
support. During the 1980s these demands for liberalisation principally took the 
form of requests for the decontrol of exchange rates, agricultural prices, 
import tariffs, and perhaps most urgent of all, removal of export taxation – 
including, of course, the ‘price stabilisation funds’ of the peasant export 
economies. But by the middle of the 1990s, these demands had expanded to 
embrace governance reforms of a broader nature designed to repair the 
weakness of the African state, now seen as the fundamental reason for the 
continent’s marginalisation. 
 
If the structural adjustment prescription, as applied to all African 
economies, was broadly the same, the response was massively different. In 
particular, in respect of our sample, the two peasant export economies grew 
rapidly, and reduced poverty even more rapidly, during the 1990s and early 
2000s (Table 3), and on a dramatic scale: the headcount poverty rate in 
Ghana fell from 51% to 39% during the 1990s and then to 27% by 2005 
(Nuamah, Teal and Awoonor-Williams 2010:  1 ), and in Uganda it fell over the 
same years from 54 to 32%, a transition rivalling any achieved in any country, 
even in East Asia, over a similar period. In the settler economies, by contrast, 
poverty, in a headcount sense, increased on a long-term basis over the same 
years. Even more importantly for the long term, there was a bifurcation in 
institutional capacity : tax-to-GDP ratios increased quite sharply in Uganda 
and Ghana in the 1990s, but fell in the settler economies. We have already 
reviewed a number of the drivers which explain why this bifurcation happened. 
                                                 
27
  ‘Structural adjustment’, in this context, meant policies (principally measures which liberalised 
the markets for crops, foreign exchange, and capital, and thereby facilitated an opening-up of the 
economy) which changed the structure of incentives, and thereby were able to boost the economy’s 
supply side – by contrast with demand-side measures, which restricted demand and therefore reduced 
output. By means of these policies, the Bank hoped to be able to give an expansionary impetus to the 
economy, to contrast with the deflationary bias of the IMF’s advice and policies. This boost eventually 
happened – but in Africa took many years, most of the 1980s and 90s in fact, to materialise (Mosley 
and Weeks 1995, etc). 
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The first and most crucial factor was that as previously discussed the peasant 
export economies possessed, and the settler economies did not possess, a 
stock of labour-intensive assets available to be liberalised. When, through the 
course of the early 1990s, Ghana increased from 35% to over 70% the share 
of the export price of cocoa received by the producer (Table 4 above) and 
when Uganda increased by an even greater proportion the share of the coffee 
price received by the farmer, they were transferring not only around 10 per 
cent of GDP out of government hands, but transferring it to an extremely wide, 
and predominantly smallholder-based, constituency (incomes of about 85% of 
Ugandans affected by what happens to coffee revenues, according to Collier 
and Reinikka28). To be sure, there was privatisation of assets going on at the 
same time in the settler economies, but nothing which spread the resulting 
wealth nearly so broadly. This sudden positive shock, which made possible 
the realisation of  a poverty dividend created in the 1920s, is in our view a 
crux helping to explain why the historical roots of poverty are so deep in the 
settler economies and why the post-1990 fall in poverty in the peasant export 
economies has been so dramatic.  
 
Secondly, and directly connected with the ebbing of the 1970s tide of 
political violence and instability described above, patterns of both recurrent 
and capital expenditure were reformed in a far more pro-poor direction in the 
peasant export economies than in the settler economies. In Uganda, in the 
aftermath of a savage guerrilla war, large inflows, both of official aid and NGO 
contributions, entered the country, and donors took advantage of the 
opportunity to contractually exchange additional aid inflows in return for a pro-
poor reallocation of parts of the expenditure budget. The Permanent Secretary 
to the Uganda Treasury explained in this way how this was achieved: 
 
 
‘We were being asked to implement cuts in the civil service establishment [in order to 
meet government expenditure ceilings agreed with the IMF] and at the same time I was 
being asked for ideas about how to make the expenditure programme more pro-poor. It 
immediately occurred to me that the way to do this was to offer to exempt from the 
process of retrenchment [i.e. civil service cuts] the expenditure sectors that we saw as 
having most benefit to poor people- that is, primary health and education, agricultural 
research and extension, and rural water and sanitation. Primary health and education 
we saw as particularly important because of the HIV/AIDS situation, and also because 
we were working towards the objective of universal primary education by the 
millennium.’29 
 
Thus was formed, for the first time since the 1920s, a political coalition in 
Africa in support of pro-poor action – in this case between aid donors, large 
                                                 
28
   The diffusion of cocoa and coffee proceeds was in particular to three groups: (1)to workers 
(given that peasant production is very labour-intensive) (2) to backward and forward linkages 
industries; (3) in the case of foodcrops, to consumers. For further analysis see Reinikka and Collier 
(2001), especially chapters 4 and 5. 
 
29
            Emanuel Tumusime- Mutabile, interview with author, 3 November 1994. 
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and small farmers,30 and trading interests willing to take a bet on benefiting 
from the liberalisation of smallholder grain production. The incentives to 
collaboration in support of such coalitions were much greater because the 
costs of the coalitions coming unstuck, in the form of a renewal of war 
atrocities from whose effects many Ugandans are still recovering, were 
obvious to all parties. A similar argument applies in the peasant export 
economies of Ethiopia, Rwanda and Mozambique, each of which came to the 
end of savage guerrilla wars in the 1990s31. As can be seen, although the 
reforms described above relate to the poverty content of recurrent 
expenditure, they also have implications for the pro-poor reorientation of 
capital expenditure also, especially in the case of the universal primary 
education objective. No pro-poor chemistry at this time occurred in the settler 
economies, where (with the occasional exception of Zambia) the poverty 
element of the policy dialogue was notoriously tense and uncreative32. 
 
It is of relevance that at this time the ambience of international finance 
was altering at this time, firstly towards a pro-poor emphasis and secondly 
towards different technologies for achieving this objective. The International 
(later Millennium) Development Goals  in 1996 consolidated the international 
financial institutions’ intention to prioritise the poverty reduction objective 
above others; one element in this was the development of Poverty Reduction 
Strategies (PRSs; formerly Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, PRSPs) 
under which recipient governments were invited to produce poverty reduction 
plans agreed with all of their political ‘constituencies’, and in particular poor 
people. At the same time the conditionality objective, the main proof of the 
World Bank’s structural adjustment strategy from 1980 until that time, was at 
the same time being abandoned, on the evidence that it usually did not work. 
The new system left much more of the initiative with the recipient – in 
particular it provided more leeway for recipients to propose, as part of a long-
term agreement, a proposed policy package (eg as part of a PRSP) rather 
than for such packages to be imposed on them by donors. The peasant export 
economies – and in particular six of them, Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda and Mozambique -  were much keener, given the nature of 
their political economies, to propose initiatives of this type than the settler 
economies. Within the context of the Lewis model of Figure 4, both the 
liberalisation of export taxation and the emergence from the governance crisis 
of the 1970s can be seen as shift parameters which moved the demand-for 
labour curve outward, and raised the real wage, much more rapidly in the 
peasant export than in the settler economies.  
 
                                                 
30
  In Uganda, the fact that the President had won a guerrilla war and had a rural power-base 
amongst smallholders in the southwestern region was crucial  (a similar argument applies to Tigre in 
Ethiopia) 
 
31
  Ghana was a slightly different case, because in the 1980s it was recovering, not from civil war, 
but simply from twenty years of systematic mismanagement of its economy.  
 
32
   In the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe, on which we focus here ,  this is particularly clear; 
indeed the aid donors had been expelled from Zimbabwe by 1999.  
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           Current poverty dynamics in Africa are therefore, we argue, deeply 
rooted in political forces established many years back, including in particular 
the structure of institutions (notably affecting control over land) and policies 
(notably affecting the composition and incidence of public expenditure) 
established early in the colonial period. In the next section, we seek to 
estimate statistically the effect of these changing political alignments on the 
key welfare indicators in our model, - the real wage level and the infant 
mortality rate. 
 
 
3. Real wage and mortality regressions 
Specification of the ‘augmented Lewis model’ 
         We are using infant mortality as a measure of poverty (or the reverse of 
well-being), and in the preceding discussion we have examined the political 
influences bearing on the well-being of the poor and its principal components, 
labour incomes and agricultural sales. Labour incomes are, of course, the 
principal dependent variable of the Lewis model (figure 4 above), and 
the main contribution of this paper has been to chart time series of these 
principal components and to identify a key policy variable influencing the 
outcomes of the Lewis model, namely government pro-poor expenditure and 
investment in the physical and human capital of the poor. We now specify the 
long-term influences on poverty which we are seeking to estimate in the form 
of an expanded version of the Lewis model. 
 The Lewis model (figure 4 above) is in its essence a supply-demand 
model of the labour market, with the demand for modern-sector labour 
corresponding to the marginal revenue product of labour, and therefore 
declining with increases in the amount of labour hired : 
 
Ld  = α1(L, w)                                                                                        (1) 
 
where Ld  = demand for labour,  L = labour force and w = real wage of 
unskilled labour within the modern sector. 
 
whereas the supply of labour is governed by the conditions under which 
labour is willing to detach itself from the subsistence economy, being 
‘unlimited’ in those cases where there are many applicants for every job at the 
going wage. In his 1954 essay (Lewis 454: 409), Lewis speculated that labour 
would leave the subsistence economy as long as the wage offered exceeded 
the average productivity of labour in the subsistence (or ‘traditional’) sector, 
and this formulation has the merit of focussing attention, as Lewis wished, on 
the productivity of the subsistence sector on small-scale farms and elsewhere 
as the basic driver of the real wage and thence of poor people’s well-being33. 
On this view, 
 
Ls = α2 (Ys /L, w)                                                                                  (2) 
 
                                                 
33
 ‘The prices of tropical commercial crops will always permit only subsistence wages until, for a 
change, capital and knowledge are put at the disposal of the subsistence producers to increase the 
productivity of tropical food production for home consumption’ ( Lewis 1954: 442) 
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where Ys = output from subsistence sector  and Ls  = labour supply. 
 Our main innovation has been to argue that both the level and the mix 
of taxation and public expenditure make a difference to the operation of this 
model, and thence to the long-term poverty index.  For, as discussed in the 
previous section, the level of government investment and the extent to which 
that investment was focussed on the infrastructure and the human capital of 
the poor, both through capital and through recurrent expenditure, increased 
the productivity of the subsistence economy. By the same token, taxation 
imposed on that subsistence economy, especially through the removal of the 
difference between the price of staple exports and the farm-gate price into a 
‘price stabilisation fund’, reduced the subsistence sector’s productivity. Finally, 
political instability at various points reduced the subsistence sector’s 
productivity, a problem which within our sample reached its nadir during the 
chaos of the Idi Amin period in Uganda34 but which caused severe depletion 
of African productivity and competitiveness at many other times.  We insert 
these four variables,  the real level of public expenditure, the extent to which 
that expenditure was focussed on low-income Africans,   the level of 
agricultural quasi-taxation, and the level of political disturbances, into the 
demand function (1): 
 
Ld  = α1 (g, ppe, t, SPI)(L, w)                                                                    (1’)  
 
where g =  real level of government expenditure 
ppe         = share of total expenditure committed to ‘pro-poor’ functions 
t              = level of quasi-taxation (export price, less price received by  
                  farmers) on agricultural exports 
SPI         = socio-political instability index 
 
Solving for the equilibrium real wage, reached at the point where (1’) equals 
(2), we have 
 
W* = f [ (α1/α2) (g, ppe, t, SPI)(Ys/L)]                                                        (3) 
                                                                         
- in words, the real wage level can be expected to evolve over time at a 
rate determined by the fundamental factor, identified by Lewis, of the 
productivity of the subsistence sector, and also by variations in the 
fiscal instruments which bear on the productivity and asset holdings of 
the poor (g, ppe, and t) and political disturbances (SPI). 
 
Because almost all of the livelihood of the poor derives either from wages or 
from agricultural (crop and livestock) incomes – themselves also subject to 
political disturbances - , it is reasonable to suppose that these three factors 
have a large part in explaining our chosen indicator of poverty – infant 
mortality, M: 
 
M = f (W*, Ys/L, SPI)                                                                                 (4) 
 
                                                 
34
 See Joergensen(1981) and Reinikka and Collier(2001). 
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Finally, political instability is not exogenous but is determined by the forces 
determining the incentive to rebel against the government, including in 
particular the real labour income and educational level of potential rebels and  
the extent to which government policies provokes of seeks to calm incipient 
conflict. 
 
SPI = f (Ys/L, ede, MC)                                                                               (5) 
 
where ede represents investment in education and MC is ‘military centrality’, 
or the factors, including the level of military expenditure, determining the level 
of provocation or otherwise of the civil population by the government. 
 
The basic system which we wish to estimate consists, therefore, consists of 
an equation determining long-term poverty (4), one element in which is real 
wages, which are determined by the real wage equation (3), and another 
element in which is political instability, which is endogenous to individual well-
being (Nafziger et al 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004). 
 
  Our first estimates of the basic estimating equation for mortality (4) are 
presented in Table 5, separately for each of the case-study countries. Several 
of the variables in the data-set, notably mortality, agricultural productivity and 
pro-poor expenditure, are subject to a time-trend, which is controlled for by 
including it explicitly in the estimating equation. All of the independent 
variables in Table 5 have the expected sign: our interpretation is that if the 
legal framework is consistent with wide-scale improvement of smallholder 
agricultural productivity, - as was achieved in Ghana and Uganda during the 
interwar period - that ‘puts a floor’ under the level of the real wage, which in 
turn reduces the mortality indicator of poverty. In addition, however, policy 
influences play a role. Increases in the PPE ratio (the share of pro-poor 
expenditures in the total), increases in the share of the export price received 
by the producer, and decreases in political instability are all associated with 
reduced levels of mortality. However, the policy variable, the PPE ratio, has 
more leverage on mortality in the peasant export economies, Ghana and 
Uganda(third row of the table) whereas agricultural productivity (real value 
added per capita) has more leverage in the settler economies, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe. 
.  
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Table 5.    Single-equation OLS mortality regressions 
 
Dependent variable:  infant (under 1) mortality. Estimation period: 1914-2009  
 
 
Regression 
coefficients on 
independent 
variables: 
‘Peasant export economies’ ‘Settler economies’ 
Ghana Uganda Kenya Zimbabwe 
Constant 319.2** 
(8.27) 
304.0** 
(19.69) 
151.7 
(2.62) 
300.9** 
(18.39) 
 Real agricultural 
value added  per 
capita (first 
difference; kg/ha) 
-.14 
(0.29) 
-.19 
(1.70) 
-1.83** 
(2.63) 
-0.58* 
(1.64) 
PPE ratio -3.23** 
(4.65) 
-4.67** 
(4.98) 
-0.65 
(0.80) 
-2.03 
(1.68) 
Share of export 
price received by 
farmer 
-90.9* 
(2.15) 
-84.4** 
(3.43) 
-61.5 
(0.77) 
-40.6* 
(2.52) 
Conflict dummy -7.79 
(0.28) 
-0.21 
(0.28) 
-8.29** 
(3.52) 
-1.26** 
(2.94) 
Time (years since 
1914)  
-2.11** 
(6.99) 
-2.65 
(8.65) 
-0.98** 
(2.90) 
-2.46** 
(12.68) 
R2 0.78 0.85 0.72 0.96 
N 49 65 13 58 
 
Table 5: Notes and sources.  
All relationships are estimated as single equations by OLS. Data are derived from the 
following sources: 
 
Mortality indicator (M): Infant mortality rate, that is mortality rate per thousand of those below 
1 year of age: principally from World Bank, World Development Indicators, and from 
Kuczynski (1948), supplemented by sources listed in Appendix 1 below. 
 
Real wage indicator ( W) 1914=100 in all cases. Data arrays for money wages and price 
indices are presented in Appendix 1 below. 
 
Agricultural sales (AS) are agricultural sales of African origin  per head of African population, 
derived from Blue Books and Annual Trade Reports of the countries specified. These are 
defined as sales within the following countries:  Zimbabwe: maize, ‘small grains’, (finger and 
bulrush millet), groundnuts, cotton, smallholder tobacco, fruits vegetables. Kenya: maize, 
smallholder coffee, smallholder tea, smallholder pyrethrum, fruits, vegetables. Kenya: maize, 
smallholder coffee, smallholder tea, smallholder pyrethrum, fruits, vegetables, sugar. Ghana: 
maize, cocoa and derivatives, kolanuts, fruits, vegetables, sugar.  
 
Pro-poor expenditure (PPE):  combined share of agriculture, health and education in GDP, 
from Blue Books, and after 1970  from IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. 
 
Pro-poor expenditure less coercion (PPE-C):  combined share of agriculture, health and 
education, less share of  ‘coercion’  (military, police and prisons expenditure) in GDP, from 
Blue Books, and after 1970  from IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. 
 
Share of export price received by producer . Uganda to 1978: Annual Trade Reports; after 
1978: figure 3.8, ‘Development of Producer Prices in Uganda’, in Akiyama(2001). Ghana,  to 
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1978: Annual Trade Reports; after 1978: figure 2.6, ‘Cocoa producer prices in West Africa’ in 
Varangis and Schreiber(2001). 
 
Political instability index is measured as the product of the ucdp_loc conflict index presented 
in Appendix 1 and ‘military centrality’, represented here as the share of military expenditure in 
total expenditure. 
 
Full data arrays and further details of estimation methods are presented in Appendices 1 and 
2. 
 
 As discussed above, two of the determinants of mortality, agricultural 
productivity and political instability, are endogenous, and therefore there is a 
risk that simple OLS regressions such as those presented in Table 5 may 
present biased estimates of the determinants of mortality. To offset this bias, 
we present in Table 6 estimates of the determinants of mortality derived by 
instrumental variables methods, in which separate equations for agricultural 
productivity and political instability are estimated simultaneously with the 
mortality equation. These estimates also differentiate between the different 
components of expenditure contained within the pro-poor expenditure ratio.
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Table 6. Simultaneous-equation regressions: mortality, wages and political instability index 
Estimation method. 3SLS. Estimation is for period 1914-2007 unless otherwise stated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Peasant export economies’ 
(Ghana and Uganda) 
‘Settler economies’ 
(Kenya and Zimbabwe) 
Whole sample 
     Dependent  
     variable: 
Infant (under 
1) 
mortality 
Real wage 
index 
Conflict 
dummy 
Infant (under 
1) 
Mortality 
Real wage 
index 
Conflict 
dummy 
Infant 
(under 1) 
Mortality 
Real 
wage 
index 
Conflict 
dummy 
Regression coefficients on 
Independent variables: 
Constant 
 
 
130.2** 
(5.47) 
 
 
193.7** 
(3.77) 
 
 
6.57** 
(13.01) 
 
 
222.4** 
(5.43) 
 
 
68.0** 
(5.82) 
 
 
0.68 
(0.34) 
 
 
-171.4** 
(7.49) 
 
 
135.8** 
(3.41) 
 
 
5.95** 
(13.75) 
Agricultural value added  per capita 
(first difference; kg/ha) 
-0.35 
(0.83) 
2.92** 
(3.08) 
 -1.59** 
(3.71) 
  1.46* 
(1.96) 
3.58** 
(4.60) 
 
Real wage(first difference) -0.30 
(1.44) 
 0.003 
(1.12) 
-0.49** 
(2.70) 
2.16** 
(7.04) 
0.009 
(0.71) 
-0.27* 
(2.13) 
 0.005* 
(2.46) 
Conflict dummy 14.85** 
(6.73) 
  3.94** 
(3.09) 
  9.90** 
(5.94) 
  
Share of education in total 
expenditure 
-5.82** 
(3.60) 
  -8.01** 
(7.69) 
  -10.71** 
(5.31) 
  
Share of health in total expenditure       -4.27 
(0.74) 
  
Share of agriculture in total 
expenditure 
      11.1** 
(6.47) 
  
Share of military in total expenditure  -11.09 
(1.64) 
  6.01* 
(2.24) 
  -4.91 
(0.89) 
 
PPE ratio (net of military 
expenditure) 
  -0.21** 
(4.68) 
  0.16 
(1.67) 
  -0.19** 
(6.00) 
Producer’s share of export price  31.7 
(1.61) 
  86.7** 
(3.27) 
  38.5* 
(2.26) 
  
R2  0.45 0.16 0.70 0.84 0.18 0.01 0.70 0.19 0.21 
Hansen-Sargan overidentification 
statistic 
143.2 63.9 220.3 
Number of observations 107 57 137 
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Sources: as for Table 6. All data arrays are in Appendices and 2 below. 
 
Notes: ‘Conflict dummy’ is defined as sum of ucdp_loc conflict index (see Appendix 2) and ‘military centrality’, defined here  
as the share of military expenditure in total expenditure. 
 
Figures in parentheses below coefficients are Student’s t-statistics. ** against a coefficient denotes significance at the 1% level  
and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
 32 
 Across the sample as a whole, within the set of expenditures which our prior 
analysis has identified as ‘pro-poor’, educational expenditures appear to be 
much the most significant in terms of bringing down poverty, and in particular 
more significant than health or agricultural expenditures. In the mortality 
equation, a  1% increase in the share of educational expenditures in total 
expenditure is highly significant across the sample as a whole and associated, 
when the sample is subdivided, with a 8% reduction in the infant mortality rate 
in the settler economies, or a 5% reduction in the peasant export economies. 
This effect appears to be stable across the time period of our sample, but is 
stronger during the colonial period, prior to 1960, than during the post-colonial 
period35.  The real wage is significantly determined, as Lewis predicted, by 
agricultural productivity, and the likelihood of conflict is determined both by the 
real wage and, more significantly, by the pro-poor expenditure ratio, 
supporting our hypothesis that the allocation of expenditure exercises 
influence on poverty indirectly through its impact on the likelihood of conflict, 
as well as a direct influence on indicators of well-being. This method of 
estimation appears to deal satisfactorily with the problem of endogeneity of 
the real wage and of conflict: the Sargan test statistics indicate that the 
system of equations is adequately identified. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
Thus, on our interpretation, improvements in smallholder agricultural 
productivity have been the prime mover in enabling poverty, in some poor 
African countries, to be brought down over time, and some of the recent 
successes in this field represent the realisation of assets established many 
decades ago.  At a different rate within different types of colonial and post-
colonial structure,  these improvements in agricultural productivity have put a 
floor underneath the subsistence-determined wage of the Lewis model (1954), 
and in so doing they have helped, especially in the ‘peasant export’ 
economies, to even up the income distribution and thus achieve a further 
development dividend through their contribution to conflict reduction. They 
have not done this unaided, and the composition of public spending, which is 
in turn determined by the character of the prevailing political regime and its 
ability to maintain the rule of law, has exercised a measurable influence on the 
ability of the economy to reduce poverty.  Within the set of expenditures 
whose influence is identifiable from table 6 as being pro-poor, by far the most 
robust of these influences is that working through educational spending. This 
supports the intuition of Sir Gordon Guggisberg, who as governor of the Gold 
Coast in the early 1920s put education as the first priority in his inaugural 
development plan36, as well as the subsequent econometric analysis of 
mortality by Ssewanyana et al. (2007).  
At this point our argument intersects with the argument about 
institutional impact put forward by Acemoglu et al. (2001).  There is no doubt 
                                                 
35
 Within a three-equation system comprising infant mortality, real wages and conflict identical to that 
estimated in  table 7, the coefficient of educational expenditure on infant mortality is strong (a 
coefficient of 15.4) and significant at the 1% level across our sample as a whole for the period prior to 
1960, whereas it is insignificant for the period after 1960. 
36
 See Kimble ( 1963): 109-125, and Wraith(1967), chapter 6. 
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that effective institutions, as they argue, are an abiding positive influence on 
economic development, but we take a different view of the institutions which 
are important. On our interpretation, the institutions which have been 
important in determining long-term trends in well-being in Africa are the 
allocation of land,  the level of capital expenditure on infrastructure, and the 
allocation of recurrent expenditure between ‘developmental’ and ‘non-
developmental’ functions, and all of these are influenced by the initial decision 
at the turn of the twentieth century to establish colonies as either settler or 
peasant export economies. Institutional development, in other words, was 
determined by prior political decisions, and the institutional structure which on 
our analysis optimized the rate of poverty reduction was not a structure which 
protected the colonists’ property rights against expropriation, but rather a 
structure which protected African smallholders’ property rights against the 
colonists.  Over time, we argue, this structure, much though it was buffeted by 
export taxation and political instability between the 1940s and the 1970s, 
contributed to a stock of physical and human capital within the peasant export 
economies of Uganda and Ghana, which the governments of those countries 
were able to draw on in a poverty-reducing manner during the 1990s, with the 
help of a big liberalisation dividend as the level of  quasi-taxation by marketing 
boards was finally reduced.  By contrast, in the settler economies of Kenya 
and Zimbabwe the level of inequality was persistingly higher and the 
intersectoral allocation of government expenditure persistingly less favourable 
to lower income groups: the ‘historical stock’ of poverty-reducing institutions 
and assets which Uganda and Ghana had been able to accumulate was not 
available to them, and the poverty trend since the middle 1980s, in both 
countries, has been much less favourable. In other words, our argument is 
that long-period poverty trends are determined by poverty-reducing 
institutions, which in turn are in part determined by colonial policies.  Many 
readers of this paper will have seen the huge advertisements for the Coffee 
Marketing Board on the road from Kampala to Entebbe, asserting that ‘Coffee 
Eradicates Poverty’. It went a long way towards doing so, during the 1990s; 
but only because it was in the hands of low-income producers, because those 
producers had access to a supportive infrastructure established in or before 
the 1920s and because recent reforms had removed the barrier which for fifty 
years had been imposed on farmers’ share of the export price. In illustrating 
these things, we hope to have shown the part played by deep-rooted historical 
influences, the understanding of which may help the present-day process of 
poverty reduction. 
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 Appendix 1.  Annual wage, price and mortality data (1912-2009), four 
African countries 
 
‘Settler economies’ ‘Peasant export economies’ 
 
Zimbabwe Kenya Ghana Uganda 
 
M MW PI RW M MW PI RW M MW PI RW M MW PI 
1914=
100 
(1989=
100 in 
brack
ets) 
RW 
1912              5   
1913                 
1914   100   18.6 100 100  30 100 100 315 7 100 100 
1915       148 80     320 6.65 107 97 
1916  18  100  16 117 62 292    325  110 90 
1917  22  81  15 145 51     335  129 81 
1918  18  74   195 65  22  68 345   70 
1919    70   254 68     360   60 
1920   161 64  15 226 80   265  370 6.4 258 51 
1921 338 21  45  17 306 91 247    350   62 
1922 329 22  57   226 77     340 12.5  65 
1923 322 23  65  18 211 50     320   75 
1924 300 21  55  20 233 50  45 123  305 11.5 218 82 
1925 290 19  51 400  224   45 124 122 288 20 195 109 
1926  25 109 74 380 23 202 65  45 118 129 276   112 
1927 274 26 109 89 370 23 173 75 122 45 124 148 260   114 
1928 270  112 91 355 23 166 74 138 45  148 254 13.6 173 123 
1929 282 25 111 94 340 21 158 68 113 45  141 233 11  90 
1930 284 23 103 91 332 21  76 116 36 112 118 224  80 115 
1931 287 18 98 92 325 18 122 81 114 42   210  78 135 
1932 295 17 94 83 310 15 120 68 102  90 147 173 9 72 164 
1933 280  92  306 13 111 66 100    161  59 184 
1934 272  91  290 14 121 64 106    189 8.5  205 
1935 267 15 91 78 287 14 108 69 127 36   166   215 
1936 255  89 80 274 14  77 107 42   159   230 
1937 248  95 83 265 17  80 117 51   156 11 63 248 
1938 238 17  86 250 16  78 102    147 12 55 244 
1939 241  100 84 240  101 76 110    131  89 240 
1940 246   82 230   74 110    134   226 
1941 254   80 222   72 110 54 122 150 124   195 
1942 256   78 210   71 118    137   160 
1943 258   76 198   70 129 54 122 150 121 15.5 142 155 
1944 260   75 189   68 125    116   130 
1945 264   73 182 24  67 128   149 119  157 115 
1946 250 26  72 177 28  77 131 63 139 151 121 14 166 101 
1947 227 36 198 96 165 36 198 90 133 81  150 126  174 120 
1948 222  213 96 170  207 96 132 81 183 149 128  237 140 
1949 220  224 97 175  215 102 134 96 183 154 144   160 
1950 216 73  97 181 74  109 130  211  143 33.5 255 187 
1951 208 51 261 98 170 51 289 98 128  217  142   175 
1952 197 58 272 99 167 58 325 99 131 135 300 151 140 32 274 166 
1953 185 62 285 106 179 62 324 106 126    139  275 180 
1954 180 64  111 178 64  111 124    138  284 250 
1955 178  296 116 178  390 114 127    137 53 302 300 
1956 174  310 121 164  379 120 132 153 344 144 136  316 320 
1957 168 86 320 126 160 87 380 126 124 153 344 146 135  323 330 
1958 164  331  145  400 123 124 165 367 147 134  326 340 
1959 160 87 340 120 135 87 400 120 123 165 367 151 133 80 326 349 
1960 159 88 343 121 122  404 130 122 195 433 165 133 114 331 437 
1961 157 90 288 140 117 90 416 140 120  446 180 127 131 341 460 
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1962 154 92 310 142 114 92 424 121 121  454 205 123 147 359 
 
492 
1963 152 101 340 149 112 101 436 128 120  485 220 119 164 391 510 
1964 148 131 370 155 110 128 447 158 120  532 235 115 194  560 
1965 145 132 388 149 108 134 437 161 119  622 255 111 215 490 561 
1966 143 135 395 152 106 142 444 167 116  673 274 109 230 529 563 
1967 142 132 399 153 104 140 455 160 114  647 302 107 241  564 
1968 140 133 403 156 102 146 463 163 113  727 322 105 247 595 566 
1969 139 133 408 151 100  461  111  808 336 104 264 608 567 
1970 138 137 414 149 96  533  110  832 345 100 290 661 569 
1971 134 141 422 148 94 163 475 177 116  875  98   530 
1972 131 145 426  92 194 480 208 114  1014  95   500 
1973 128 154 430  91 192 529 186 113  1212  101   440 
1974 124 156 434 146 89 192 613 161 111  1530  115   380 
1975 120 179  147 87 302 686 226 100  1988  119   360 
1976 118 205= 
$24.1 
 149 85 469 815 295 98  2544  124   340 
1977 116 $26.8  151 81 483 952 260 97  4267  126 549 2960 320 
1978 114 $29.3  152 79 541 980 299 95  7518     300 
1979 111 $34.2  153 77 564 1036 295 93  10363  119   280 
1980 108 $38.1 868 154 73 431 1134 206 92  15646  118   270 
1981 90 $62.0  251 71 479 1257 207   27431  117   261 
1982 81 $76.5  247 69 499 1393 194 87 C115=
$42 
(US) 
35872 201  800 5335 
(12) 
258 
1983 80 $88.3  231 68 536 1557 186 85  80185  116   244 
1984 79 $98.0  213 68  1714  84  1.1 
E05 
  
  220 
1985 78 $103.8 1741 208 65 549 1854 160 83  1.3 
E05 
 114 1000 6500 
(15) 
 
 
199 
1986 76 $114.5  184 68 619 2021 165 83  1.8 
E05 
   
 180 
1987 74 $122.1  178 66  2193  79  2.6 
E05 
 113  
 8446 
(19) 
178 
1988 72   175 66 769 2380 174 79  3.4 
E05 
 112 3127 25345 
(57) 
176 
1989 71 $150.6  160  846 2581 176 76  4.5 
E05 
 111 
 28608 
(100) 
210 
1990 69 $182.8  155 64 946 2822 178 74  
 
6.1 
E05 
 
 102 6500 37937 
(122) 
242 
1991 68 $203.3  152 63 107
4 
3148 181 70 C35, 
212= 
$74 
(US) 
 
7.3 
E05 
350 101 6600 48511 
(157) 
260 
1992 66 $171.5  137 67  3698  70  8.1 
E05 
 101 19810 74011 
(239) 
280 
1993 67 $243.8  128 67  4128  68  1.08E
06 
 100 
 78674 
(253) 
295 
1994 64 $286.9  116 73 150
0 
5582 142 65  1.54E
06 
 98 20000 86760 
(279) 
328 
1995 66 $295.7  114 73  6208  65  1.97E
06 
 96  92358 
(297) 
340 
1996 68 $401.3 13928 108 74 195
0 
6774  63  2.35E
06 
 95 26500 99199 
(319) 
355 
1997 71   106 76 232
5 
7840 156 62  2.81E
06 
 94 34000  448 
1998    104 77  8561  62  3.29E
06 
 90  76817 
(345) 
540 
1999    101 77  9051  60  3.75E
06 
 88  80825 
(366) 
560 
2000 73   99 78    58  4.77E
06 
 86  81487 
(369) 
575 
2001 76        57  6.42E
06 
  69000   
2002         57      84358 
(382) 
 
2003             81  92308  
 41 
(418) 
2004     79        79    
2005 87        53        
2006         53        
2007             79 89000   
2008                 
2009 95                
Notes and sources.  
Under-1 mortality(M).  Before 1950, from Kuczynski(1948), vol. 1 for Ghana and vol. 2 for 
Kenya and Uganda. For Zimbabwe(Southern Rhodesia) data are from Mosley(1983), 
Appendix to Chapter 3. After 1960,  all data are from World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (CD-ROM), various issues. Data for Kenya and Zimbabwe, all years, relate to 
African population only. Data in italics are linear interpolations; all other data are direct from 
the source quoted. 
 
Money wages(MW): given for all countries in shillings per month (£1 = 20 shillings) or, 
exceptionally after 1970, currency units indicated. 
. The indicator of money wages used is the average unskilled wage in the formal, enumerated 
sector. 
Zimbabwe: to 1946: Annual Reports of the Chief Native Commissioner; thereafter, Monthly 
Statistical Digests, various.  
Kenya: to 1946: Blue Books, supplemented by archival sources as listed in Mosley (1983, 
p157); thereafter, Statistical Abstracts with interpolations from Labour Department archives, 
also after 1960, International Labour Organisation, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 2009. 
Uganda: Before 1960, Wages and employment generally from Blue Books, supplemented by 
data from Powesland(1954) and Jorgensen(1981), especially his Table 2.3, also by Labour 
Department, Annual Reports. After 1960, from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 
Ghana: To 1945,wage rates and employment from Gold Coast, Social and economic 
Progress: Annual Reports, section on ‘wages and cost of living’. 1945-1960 from Birmingham 
et al(1965); after 1960, from World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
Consumer price indices:(PI): before 1960: 
Zimbabwe: Mosley(1983), chapter 4 appendix, supplemented by Index of retail prices of 
foodstuffs consumed by Zimbabwe Europeans, in Annual Yearbooks of Southern Rhodesia, 
various. 
Kenya: Index of import prices of goods consumed by Kenyan Africans CIF Mombasa, derived 
from Kenya Blue Books and reported in Mosley(1983), Chapter 4 Appendix. 
Uganda: from Blue Books, 1928, 1938 and 1944, sections on prices, wages and imports; the 
items of consumption used to compile the deflator prices are cotton piece goods, kerosene 
oil, bicycles, sugar, soap, maize flour and bananas (matooke). From 1947-1977, we use 
Uganda Government, Kampala lower income cost of living index, as published in successive 
issues of the Statistical Abstract and Quarterly Economic and Statistical Bulletin (typically 
Table UO6). After 1982, the consumer price index as published in Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning, Financial Statement and Budget Report, annual, is used. During the 
period 1977-1982, the Quarterly Economic and Statistical Bulletin is also used, but this was a 
period of considerable political turbulence and the price data published in this period should 
be regarded with some scepticism (see for example Joergensen 1981,pp. 298-299 and Table 
6.7). The entire period 1971-1982 should be regarded as a weak link in the Ugandan part of 
the table. 
Ghana: Gold Coast, Social and Economic Progress: Annual Reports, section on ‘wages and 
cost of living’ and imports; items of consumption used to compile the deflator prices are as for 
Uganda, with the addition of wheat flour and minus bananas. From 1939-1963,  
supplemented by wage index for unskilled workers in Accra 1939-1963, in Birmingham et al. 
(1965), Table 6.12. 
After 1960, all countries: from World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
Real wages, for all times and all countries, are money wages, MW, deflated by the consumer 
price index, PI. 
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Appendix 2. Annual data on determinants of poverty (mortality), four 
African countries 
 
 
‘Settler economies’ ‘Peasant export economies’ 
 
Southern 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 
Kenya Ghana Uganda 
 
Avac Ptf ede ppe Avac ptf ede ppe avac ptf ede ppe avac ptf ede ppe 
1912        6.9         
1913     1.3     
    
   
1914     ..  .. 4.9  
   
 
 
  
1915     ..    34.7 
 
1.8 4.7 1.6  0.4 6.3 
1916     ..   7.3 30.6 
 
2.5 5.7 1.7  0.3 7.1 
1917     ..  2.4 8.1 23.1 
 
3 6.4 1.6  0.4 6.4 
1918    6 ..  2.6 8.6 9.6 
 
3 6.8 1.5 0.52 0.4 6.7 
1919    7 ..  2.3 8.9 27.8 
 
3.1 7.4 2.6 0.55 0.4 8.4 
1920 2.5   7 ..  2.6 10.4 32.9 
 
4.2 8.9 3.2 0.41 0.5 8.5 
1921 1.0   8 ..  2.8 11.2 14.8 
 
5.7 11.2 9.7  0.5 6.7 
1922 ..   8.5 0.57  3 12.5 25.6 
 
7 13.1   0.7 6.9 
1923 ..   9 0.66  3.3 12.1 29.3 
 
8 14.3   1.2 8.1 
1924 ..   9.2 1.07  3.6 12.5 31.6 
 
8.5 15.1 2.5  1.6 9.1 
1925 .. .85 4.9 9.5 1.34  3.8 12 46.6 
 
9 15.7 5.3  2.0 11.7 
1926 .. .85 5 17.5 1.17 .83 4.4 11.3 38.8 
 
10 16.9 8.8  3.2 12 
1927 1.6 .86 6 17.5 1.14  4.6 10 48.1 
 
10.5 18.1 11.7  3.3 11.8 
1928 3.6 .86 6.9 12.4 1.15  4.8 10.4  
 
12 19.7 10.6  3.6 12.9 
1929 2 .86 7.4 12.8 1.71 .81 5.1 13.8 37 
 
13 21.2 5.9  3.5 13.1 
1930 2.8 .75  14 1.56 .82 5.5 13.7 33 
 
12 20.5 9.1  3.9 1.8 
1931 .. .70  13.6 0.58 .80 5.7 13.4  
 
11.9 21.8 10.7  4.6 15.7 
1932 1.5 .64  12.9 1.02  5.8 11.7  
 
12.4 22.8 9.9  5.3 15.5 
1933 2.4 .60  13.0 1.31  6.1 11.8 29.3 
 
12.5 23 14.4  6 18 
1934 7.2 .65  13.1 1.1  6.3 12.4 27.1 
 
12.6 20.3 11.8  6.2 19.2 
1935 6.8 .65  12.9 1.39 .59 6.6 12.9 26.1 
 
12.5 21.4 18.6  6.3 18.3 
1936 9.2 .67  13.5 1.74 .60 6.8 14.7 23.5 
 
12.1 21.8 21.8  5.7 18.2 
1937 7.3 .67  13.8 2.68  6.9 13.4 29.1 
 
12.1 21.3 19.1  6 19 
1938  .72  13.6 2.3 .66 7 12.5 39.2 
 
11.6 20.6 15.2 0.24 6.2 18.6 
1939  .75  14 2 .67 7.2 13.7 21.6 
 
11.5 20.2 21.6 0.22 7.4 18 
1940  .88  13.8   7.3 13.7 40.1  11.5 19.9  0.20 7.4 19.6 
1941 8.4  8 14.8 4.0 .51 7.4 13.8 
  
11.5 19.5 26.7 0.18 7.1 19.3 
1942 12.8 .22  15 3.8 .37 7.4 14.9 
  
9.7 16.8 12.8 0.24 6.6 18.9 
1943  .32  13.9 2.7 .62 7.3 11 
  
8 14.2 8.1 0.18 6.8 20 
1944  .3  14.4 2.8 .37 6.9  
  
7.2 12.9 20.4 0.19 7.9 20.2 
1945   9.6 20.5 2.8 .68 6.7 13.4 
  
8 13.5   8.8 19.8 
1946   11.6 18 2.8 .55 6.1 13.5 
  
9 14.2   10 23.2 
1947   12.1 20.9 3.1 .59 6.5 14.3 
 
.56 9.5 16.8   10.6 24.8 
1948   12.8 23.2 3 .64 6.6 14.2 
 
.62 10 19  0.18 10.9 25.3 
1949   13.4 22.9 3.7 .49 6.7 14.3 
 
.11 11 20.2  0.16 8.3 22.6 
1950  .2 14.1 22.3 5.2 .46 6.8 13.9 
 
.59 10 16.9  0.13 8.7 25.4 
1951 15.4  13.9 24.4 5.5 .33 6.9 14 
 
.51 10.6 17.3 22.6 0.12 7.5 25.4 
1952 4.9  13.8 23.2 5.4 .37 7 14.2 
 
.39 11.7 19.4 37.3 0.15 8.5 25.8 
1953 15  13.9 22.9 6.1 .47 6.8 14.6 
 
.45 13 25.5 36 0.22 9 26.1 
1954 13.2  13.7 24.4 6.1 .59 6.7  
 
.66 13.4 22.4 23 0.19 8 26.5 
1955 29.5  14 23.2 6.9 .70 6.8 14.8 
 
.6 14 23.2     
1956 8.1  14.1 24.3 6.7 .69 7.5 15.4 
 
.33 14.1 24.7 28 0.26 8.5 27.1 
1957 6.5 .36 13.8 23.6 7.1 .79 8.4 15.8 
 
.26 14.1 25.7 27 0.28 9.2 27.5 
1958 7.4 .36 13.9 22.7 8.6 .75 8.7 16.3 
 
.58 14.3 29.2 35.1 0.31 9.3 28.4 
1959 5.2 .27 13.8 21.9 8.9 .64 9.5 16.8 
 
.52 12.3 26.4  0.29 9.5 29 
1960 11.3 .39 13.9 22.3 9.4 .92 9.6 16.7 
 
.49 14.5 27.6  0.32 9.7 28.7 
1961 14.5  14.1 21.6 11.5 .85 9.7 16 35.5 .34 15 28.9  0.31 10 29.8 
1962 20.1  14 22.1 12.1  9.8 16.5 34.4 .35 16 30 28.1 0.31 11.5 30.2 
1963 6.6  14.1 22.7 13.4  9.7 16.8 34 .38 16.2 30.8 30.8 0.26 11.7 31.4 
1964 1.5  14.3 22.4 20.5  15.3 9.8 33.6 .4 16.6 31.2 28.6 0.24 12.9 32 
1965 1.4  14.4 21.8 18.0  9.7 17.5 50.3 .38 17.8 33.7 39 0.25 13.4 31.2 
1966   14.5 21.2 21.6  9.9 17.7 68.7 .45 22.6 36.7 45.6 0.24 12.3 33.4 
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1967   14.6 20.9 21.5  9.8 18.2 71.4 
 
19.4 32.4 40.4 0.20 10 29 
1968   14.5 20.5 21.9  10 18.9 69.8 
 
19.7 33.3 41.5 0.19 13.5 28.5 
1969 32.99  14.4 20.9 23.3  9.9 19 73.9 
 
19.8 32.8 46.2 0.25 13.3 29.7 
1970 29.86  14.5 20.6 20.9  9.8 18.4 81.1 
   
46.8 0.22 13 28.7 
1971 36.94  13.9 20 23.6  10.1 18.9 82.6 
   
57.7 0.22 14 28.4 
1972 40.71  14 20.9 25.6  10.2 19.5 83.2 
   
46.5 0.21 12 27 
1973 32.08  14.1 20.7 25.5  10.3 19.9 79.0 
   
35.6 0.21 9 23 
1974 36.98  14.2 21 24.2  10.2 19.5 83.4 
   
27.3 0.19 9 21 
1975 33.99  13.9 20.8 25.2  10.3 19.9 65.1 
   
26.6 0.19 8 19 
1976 37.00  14 21.4 24.9  10.4 19.2 62.6 
    
0.22 6 14 
1977 28.53  14.1 21.6 26.6  10.4 19.6 57.9 
    
0.25 5 12 
1978 30.77  14.2 21.5 26.8  10.5 19.8 67.7 
    
0.27 6.2 17 
1979 30.08  14.3 21.6 26.7  10.6 20.1 68.1 
    
0.28 6.5 15 
1980 29.81  14.5 20.6 26.1  11.5 19.9 64.1 0.21 11.8 16.8 
 
0.32 6.5 13 
1981 32.96  15.9 22.7 26.7  11.4 20.9 59.0 0.23 11.4 16.2  0.33 6.7 14.4 
1982 29.58  16.5 24.6 27.7  11.1 20.6 53.1 0.25 11.9 16.8 29.9 0.32 6.5 14.5 
1983 24.09  15.7 23.3 27.2  9.7 19.2 56.3 0.25 11.7 .. 31.1 0.31 6.6 14.4 
1984 28.65  16.2 25.7 25.4  10.3 18.7 54.1 0.27 11.4 16.7 29.3 0.30 7 14.7 
1985 34.27  16.8 26.1 25.5  11.1 19.9 55.1 0.31 11.5 16.6 27.5 0.36 7 15.5 
1986 30.41  16 25.6 25.9  11.4 20.2 53.8 0.36 11.3 16 27.4 0.44 7.2 16.2 
1987 28.18  16.6 26.6 26.0  11.8 21.2 54.3 0.42 11.3 16 27.1 0.50 7 14.5 
1988 28.19  16.8 27.6 26.3  11.1 20.5 55.3 0.44 11.3 15.4 27.8 0.40 7 15.5 
1989 28.34  16.9 27.2 26.6  11.4 22.2 52.9 0.47 11.3 16.1 29.3 0.26 7.2 15.9 
1990 30.97  17.7  26.7  11.7 19.7 54.4 0.53 11.2 14 29.4 0.28 7 15.9 
1991 30.75  17.7  25.6  11.7 19.9 52.2 0.58 11.8 14.5 28.5 0.28 7.2 16.7 
1992 23.28  17.1  23.9  11.2 19.1 51.9 0.45 12.4 15.5 30.5 0.60 7.4 17.6 
1993 29.24  17.8  22.36  12 20.4 51.5 0.26 12.4 15.6 30.4 0.65 7.5 17.9 
1994 31.04  17.8 13.1 22.38  11.4 19.2 51.9 0.34 12.4 15.6 31.5 0.68 7.6 18.5 
1995 28.39  18.8 14.9 22.72  11.3 18.6 53.4 0.38 12.4 15.9 32.2 0.76 7.8 18.9 
1996 33.69  18.8 15.2 23.07  11.4  54.4 0.41 12.4 16 31.9 0.84 8 19.1 
1997 34.45  18.4 17 21.76  11.5  55.9 0.44 13.1 16.6 31.9 0.95 8.4 19.3 
1998 35.90  18.9 18 22.50  11.5  57.4 0.46 13.5 16.5 33.4 0.97 8.6 19.6 
1999 37.14  18.3 17 22.24  11.5   0.48 13.6 17.8 34.1 0.96 9 20.8 
2000 37.98  13.9 16 21.29  11.3 21  0.50 13.8 18 35.0 0.96 9.1 21.1 
2001 33.05  14 
 
21.18 
 
12.1 21.5 
 
 13.8 19 
 
 9.2 21.5 
2002   14 
 
  
11.1 22 
 
 14.6 19.6 
 
 9.4 20.2 
2003   12    12.1    15 21   9.6 21.1 
2004   12    12.4    15.4 20.4   10 20.7 
2005   12            
 
20.9 
2006   10            
 
21.4 
2007   9            
 
 
2008                 
2009                 
 
Sources:  
Agricultural value added per head (avad) is an estimate, calculated at constant 1975 US dollar  prices, of agricultural 
sales  per head of African population. For years after 1960 the estimate is derived from the World Bank  World 
Development Indicators CD-ROM. Prior to 1960,  it is derived from Blue Books and Annual Trade Reports of the 
countries specified, including the following crops:  Zimbabwe: maize, ‘small grains’, (finger and bulrush millet), 
groundnuts, cotton, smallholder tobacco, fruits vegetables. Kenya: maize, smallholder coffee, smallholder tea, 
smallholder pyrethrum, fruits, vegetables. sugar. Ghana: maize, cocoa and derivatives, kolanuts, fruits, vegetables, 
sugar. Per capita sales of these crops, net of an estimate for the value of inputs, are converted to constant 1960 
prices by use of the country consumer price indices described in Appendix 1. 
 
Price to producer as proportion of export price (ptf). Uganda to 1978: Annual Trade Reports; after 1978: figure 3.8, 
‘Development of Producer Prices in Uganda’, in Akiyama(2001). Ghana,  to 1978: Annual Trade Reports; after 1978: 
figure 2.6, ‘Cocoa producer prices in West Africa’ in Varangis and Schreiber(2001). 
 
 
 Educational expenditure as share of total expenditure(ede): includes all public and private, including mission school, 
expenditure of education; from Blue Books, and after 1970 from IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. 
 
Pro-poor expenditure (ppe):  combined share of agriculture, health and education in GDP, from Blue Books, and after 
1970  from IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. 
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Appendix 3. Child mortality as an indicator of deprivation 
 
Many views exist on how best to select indicators of poverty, deprivation or well-being.  
Historically ,the first indicators to be used (e.g. Rowntree (1901), define poverty in terms of 
the number or proportion of people who fall below a given income standard, defined as the 
cost of meeting minimum consumption needs – the poverty headcount, or headcount ratio. 
The poverty-headcount approach has been revived in the shape of the World Bank’s (2000) 
‘dollar-a-day’ measure, which uses the one standard metric of income below $1 per diem at 
1990 purchasing-power parity, in place of national poverty lines,  in order to standardise the 
measure of deprivation across all countries. Most analysts, and in particular the global 
Millennium Development Goals ( World Bank 2000, figure 1.1 ) supplement the poverty-
headcount measure with other metrics, including measures of maternal and infant mortality, 
education, and in some instances measures of  
 
The poverty-headcount measure, in every country, exists only for a small number of years, 
mostly since the middle 1980s, and therefore is not suitable for assessing  long-period trends 
in deprivation. This appendix considers the case for using infant mortality as a measure of 
deprivation in those cases where data on headcount poverty are not available. 
 
Reasons for supposing that it may be sensible to use infant mortality as a surrogate for 
headcount poverty include the following: 
 
1. For countries and periods for which we have data on both variables, infant mortality 
and malnutrition are closely related statistically. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship 
between the two variables over the period 1980-2005. 
 
Figure 5.  61 countries: Relationship between mortality and poverty, 
1980-2005 
 
 
JOR-Jordan; ECU-Ecuador; INDN-Indonesia: IND-India; JAM-Jamaica: ZW-Zimbabwe; KEN-
Kenya; ETH-Ethiopia; PHI-Philippines; KYRG-Kyrgyz; RUS-Russia; PER-Peru; GHA-Ghana; 
BUL-Bulgaria; CHIL-Chile; CHN-China; BOL-Bolivia; BRA-Brazil; TUN-Tunisia; HUN-
Hungary; THA-Thailand; SRI-Sri Lanka; DOM-Dominican Republic; BD-Bangladesh,UGA-
Uganda; POL-Poland. 
(The data matrix for these variables is available as an Excel file from 
p.mosley@sheffield.ac.uk) 
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A regression for these countries over the period 1990-2005 yielded the relationship:  
 
Poverty headcount = 19.2** + 0.28** infant mortality, r2 = 0.30, n= 291. 
                                  (11.93)   (11.10) 
 
 
2.. The main causes of high infant mortality - which are high vulnerability to life-threatening 
disease, low availability of basic nutrients, lack of access to medical services, lack of access 
to clean water and other assets which protect health, and high incidence of civil conflict-
related deaths37 – are causally related to material deprivation and specifically to the most 
extreme form of poverty, which is famine.  Even better than the absolute number of people 
below the conventional poverty line (minimum consumption requirements line), the infant 
mortality rate captures the idea of extreme poverty – those who are so deprived of basic 
capabilities that they cannot stay alive. 
 
3. Lowered infant mortality is causally related not only to current poverty but to future poverty 
– because, through the standard mechanisms of the demographic transition (Livi-Bacci1991), 
persistently lowered mortality rates increase the perceived likelihood of child survival, which 
diminishes the economic rationale for having a large family, which diminishes the total fertility 
level (the total number of children born to each parent), which is an important correlate of 
poverty levels. 
 
However, although in principle it may be reasonable to say that poverty and infant mortality 
are causally linked, the measures of infant mortality available to us in practice may not 
accurately measure infant mortality, because of errors in measurement, including: 
 
(i)  Until the date of the first Censuses ( 1911 in Ghana, but not until 1948 in Kenya, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe), records of infant deaths are based on the recollection of 
interviewees, not observation by doctors, so mortality data will be wrong if memory is 
defective or testimony is wrongly transcribed; 
(ii) registration of interviewees was for many periods incomplete, so that what appear to 
be sharp changes in mortality reflect only changes in the extent to which deaths were 
registered38; 
(iii) in particular, registrations often omit the births and deaths of children whose lives 
were very short (Clairin,1966) ; 
(iv) there are gaps in the mortality series, especially during the war years.  
 
For these reasons, data on mortality do not necessarily measure mortality well prior to the 
dates mentioned in (i). The finding from this paper about which, consequently, we have the 
most serious worry is the finding that infant mortality declined sharply in Uganda during the 
1930s ( table 3 above  ) . Our time-series on this variable for this period are transcribed 
directly from Kuczynski(1949). The finding of a fall in mortality is consistent with our data on 
real wages and agricultural productivity, and we have also attempted to clean the series by 
deleting anomalous outliers from the mortality series; notwithstanding this, the series for 
Uganda, Kenya and Zimbabwe must be taken as having a lesser degree of reliability until the 
1950s.
                                                 
37
 For documentation of these influences in the case of Uganda between 1974-99 see the paper by 
Ssewanyana and Younger(2007) 
38
 This problem is particularly well discussed in  the studies by Kuczynski(1949) and  
Goldthorpe(1955) 
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